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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the further development of administrative agency, in a slow, orderly
way, rather than to attempt to achieve this singularly desirable end,
in a single bound by constitutional amendment.
Necesgarily, administrative bodies or officers must act, not only
within the field of their prescribed statutory powers, but in a reasonable
and orderly manner. No administrative agency can properly assume
arbitrary and uncontrolled power. Numerous cases of authoritative
nature support the above doctrine, the foremost of which are: Standard
Oil Co. v. U.S. 221 U.S. I; 31 S. Ct. 502; 55 L. Ed. 619, U.S. v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. io6; 31 S. Ct. 632; 55 L. Ed. 663,
Kansas City So. Ry. v. U.S. 231 U.S. 423; 34 S. Ct. 125; 58 L. Ed.
296. To cite again the learned words of Justice Rosenberry in State
v. Whitman supra, "The rule of reasonableness inheres in every law,
and the action of those charged with its enforcement must in the nature
of things be subject to the test of reasonableness." To exemplify
this, it is apparent that no mere administrative officer could properly
decide a question of constitutionality, as held in Pollitz v. Michigan Rd.
Comm. (205 Mich. 549; 172 N.W. 61I).
As early as 1863, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had before it ques-
tions dealing with the delegation of power to administrative bodies
A tendency bordering on reluctance to develop this theory was preva-
lent, but slowly a trend appeared in favor of a more constructive
attitude on this subject, until today, the Wisconsin statutory system
confers many broad and generous powers on its administrative bodies,
notably that of the Industrial Commission. There are many Wisconsin
authorities to illustrate the almost cautious development of this addi-
tion to our state governmental system.
Adams v. Beloit (O5 Wis. 363; 81 N.W. 869), State ex rel. Boycott
v. La Crosse (107 Wis. 654; 84 N.W. 242), State ex rel. Van Alstine
v. Frear (142 Wis. 320; 125 N.W. 961), State ex rel. Nehrbass v.
Harper (162 Wis. 589; 156 N.W. 94), Klein v. Barry (182 Wis. 255;
196 N.W. 457).
In consequence, something akin to a parallel can be drawn between
the gradual, steady and constructive evolution of the principle of
administrative legislation and the feature of constitutional law which
it embodies, and other similar movements in history which owe their
inception and development to the urge of necessity and the capabilities
of men. CHESTER F. KRIZEK
Automobiles-Contributory negligence as a matter of law-Look
and listen rule applied to pedestrians.
On May 8, 1928, the Wisconsin Supreme Court gave decisions in
three cases which can be considered a trilogy of cases on contributory
negligence in automobile accident cases.
NOTES AND COMMENT
In Meriens v. Lake Shore Yellow Cab and Transfer Co.' the
plaintiff was struck while crossing the street. He testified that he
looked but saw no automobile as far as he had a clear vision which
was 250 feet. Quoting the Court from the decision in the Mertens
case.
It is apparent that if he had looked when he came flush with
the girder of the bridge, he was in exercise of that degree of care
which the law requires. Blut he is not permitted to say that he
looked, when, if he had looked, he must have seen that which was
in plain sight. [Italics ours.]
Court cites, in support of this rule, Cawley v. LaCrosse City Railway
Co.;2 White v. Chicago N.W. Ry. Co.; 3 and White v. Minn. St. P. and
S.S.M. Ry. Co.
4
The first of* these cases cited involved injury to a person driving
his machine along street car tracks, and the other two invoked the
look and listen rules at railroad crossings
In applying the look and listen rule to a pedestrian crossing the
street in the Mertens case, the Court says:
Courts have said that the look and listen rule does not apply
with- the same rigor to pedestrians crossing city streets that it does
to pedestrians crossing railroad and street car tracks. These views
were first expressed in the early days of automobile traffic, when
such traffic was not as heavy and when the operator of the automo-
bile was not in especial public favor. Year after year, however,
we find greater congestion of automobile traffic in city streets, and
the danger to the pedestrian constantly increasing. Changing con-
ditions have laid upon him a greater duty with reference to his
own safety when he attempts to cross city streets ..... While it
was formerly said that the presence of a railroad track was a warn-
ing of danger, it must be admitted that the dangers attendant upon
the crossing of a busy city street are far more numerous, even
though they be less serious. At any rate, the time has come when
ordinary care requires the pedestrian to look for approaching auto-
mobiles before he leaves the zone of safety. [Italics ours.]
In Kleist v. Cohodas;5 the second case in this triology, the plaintiff
was injured by his automobile colliding with a truck of the defendant.
The defendant's truck was parked on a highway after dark without
lights. The lights on the plaintiff's car showed at least twenty feet
ahead and his speed was such that he was unable to stop after seeing
the truck.
1218 N.W. 85; N.W. Rep. Adv. Sheets July 6, 1928.-
101 Wis. 145; 77 N.W. I79.
IO2 Wis. 489; 78 N.W. 585.
147 Wis. 141; 133 N.W. 148.
5219 N.W. 366; N.W. Rep. Adv, Sheets June 8, 1928.
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At the time of the accident there was a statute in effect which
said that a motor vehicle should be provided "with sufficient lights, of
such design and so adjusted and operated as to render the use of
the highway by such vehicles safe for all the public,"6 and "the mini-
mum requirements for head lamps on any automobile or other similar
motor vehicle, except motorcycles, while being driven upon the high-
way, shall be such as to enable the driver to clearly distinguish a per-
son, vehicle or other substantial object 200 feet ahead, and the design,
adjustment and operation of such head lamps shall be such as to avoid
dangerous glare or dazzle."'7 [Italics ours.]
In an earlier case, Lauson v Fond du Lac,8 the Superior Court di-
rectly held (Page 6o, 123 N.W. 63) that, operating an automobile
under the conditions presented that night, he was not exercising the
ordinary care required of him, if he drives the car at such a speed
that he cannot bring it to a standstill within the distance that he can
plainly see objects ahead of him; that if his lights be such that he
can see objects for only ten feet, then he must so regulate his speed
as to be able to stop within that distance, and if he fails to do so,
and an accident results from such failure, no recovery can be had;
that such is the minimum degree of care that should be required.
Since the Lauson case, which was decided in 19o9, the statutes have
consistently leaned toward more stringent requirements as to lights.
In accordance with the rule as stated in the Lauson case, supra, and
the statutes involved, the Court decided that the plaintiff had himself
violated the law regulating his own use of the highway, and, as a
matter of law, it must defeat his right to recover.
In Knapp v. Sommerville,9 which completes this trilogy of cases,
the deceased's automobile was equipped with lights, so that under ordi-
nary conditions its occupants could see an object the size of a man
200 or 300 feet ahead of them. The defendant's truck was parked on
the road without any headlights or taillights and with nothing on the
rear of the truck which would reflect the lights of an approaching
automobile. The testimony showed that the deceased did not see the
defendant's truck until he was within twelve or fifteen feet of the
point of collision, that he immediately applied the brakes and that the
car slid about ten or twelve feet and collided with the defendant's
truck causing the driver's death.
In accordance with the rule in the Lauson case, the plaintiff was
held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The
6Statutes (Wis.) 85.13 Subsection i.
'Statutes (Wis.) 85.13 Subsection 2.
141 Wis. 57; 123 N.W. 629.
219 N.W. Rep. 369; N.W. Adv. Sheets June 8, 1928.
NOTES AND COMMENT
decision in the Lauson case has been often cited and although it has
been severely criticized in some jurisdictions, it still stands as the law
in Wisconsin. ALFRED G. GOLDBERG
Conditional Sales: forfeiture.
In the case of Schneider v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 219 N.W. 370;
196 Wis. -, the plaintiff had contracted to buy, on the install-
ment plan from the defendant, certain machinery to be manufactured
to order, and had made certain payments on account, aggregating
$24,400. The written contract of conditional sale provided:
Upon failure to make payments, or any of them, as herein speci-
fied, the company [i.e., the defendant] may retain any and all par-
tial payments which have been made, as liquidated damages.
Plaintiff being in default, prior to the delivery of any of the machin-
ery, the defendant is alleged to have resold the machinery and to have
sustained no actual damage. Whereupon the plaintiff sued for a return
of the partial payments, on the theory of unjust enrichment. Defendant
demurred. Demurrer sustained.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that:
The parties having lawfully and expressly contracted for just
such a situation as arose, the law will make no other contract for
them.
Although Wisconsin has both the uniform sales act and the uniform
conditional sales act, the Court unfortunately mentioned neither. As
William M. Hargest says on page 181 of the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review for December, 1927, in his article on "Keeping
the Uniform Laws Uniform":
The courts have rather consistently failed to preserve uniformity.
There are two rather outstanding reasons for this failure. One
is the tendency of courts to adhere to stare decisis, and the other
the failure to even refer to the statute law of their own state
which governs the principle in the case ..... .The courts in
states which have adopted the Uniform Sales Act, when deciding
questions to which that Act applied failed to even refer to the
Act in 353 cases, while 941 cases cited it.
Of course, the conditional sales act cannot apply to such a case until
the goods have been delivered unless the words "is delivered" in Sec.
i of that act be construed to mean "is to be delivered." Otherwise,
the decision under review might have the effect of removing from the
protection of the act all conditional sales of made-to-order goods, for
the Court said:
The defendant was certainly under no duty to the buyer to take
any steps or legal proceedings either as to the machinery, title
